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Tunisia has witnessed an increase in conflict activity in recent years, both in the form of violent 
political protest and acts of violence perpetrated by armed jihadist groups. This report identifies 
some of the key literature on drivers of conflict in Tunisia, looking at both short-term and 
structural factors. 
The literature included in this report identifies the following drivers of conflict: 
• Socio-economic factors: The literature identifies a number of socio-economic factors, 
both structural and short-term, which serve as drivers of conflict in Tunisia. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the economy. Corruption is widespread, and unemployment 
levels, particularly among youth and in marginalised areas, are high. This has led to 
ongoing popular unrest, which shows little sign of abating. 
• Religious extremism: There has been an increase in jihadist violence in Tunisia since 
the fall of former President, Ben Ali. In recent years armed jihadist groups have joined 
forces with criminal elements posing a greater security threat. While jihadist groups are 
fragmented, the lack of a national strategy to counter violent extremism hinders the 
government’s ability to deal with armed Islamist actors effectively. 
• Political reform, security sector reform, and transitional justice: A lack of consensus 
on transitional justice among political actors hinders the government’s ability to effectively 
tackle issues like corruption. 
• Marginalised and insecure border areas: Insecurity in Tunisia’s border areas stems 
from the ongoing conflict in Libya, and from criminal elements engaged in trafficking and 
smuggling. Trans-national armed extremist groups also pose a threat to security. 
There is a relatively large body of literature on drivers of conflict in Tunisia. This consists largely 
of reports by international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and think tanks, but also 
includes some peer-reviewed academic journal articles. The literature included in this report 
consists of both English and French language reports. The literature identified during the course 
of this research is largely gender blind. 
2. Drivers of conflict 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Tunisie 
Trape, P. (2016). African Economic Outlook. Abidjan: African Development Bank 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/tunisia  
This French language report provides a detailed insight into the economic opportunities and 
challenges facing Tunisia. It finds that economic growth currently stands at 1 per cent, and that 
the unemployment rate had reached 15.6 per cent in 2016, an increase on the rate of 15.1 per 
cent in 2015. It notes that in disadvantaged areas in the country’s interior regions unemployment 
exceeds 50 per cent. However, the report finds that economic growth is expected to pick up in 
2017/2018 due to investment and the implementation of the country’s strategic development plan 
(Plan de développement stratégique 2016-2020). 
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Great expectations in Tunisia 
Yahya, M. (2015). Carnegie Middle East Center.  
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_60_Yahya_Tunisia_Final.pdf 
 
This article lists a number of socio-economic challenges facing Tunisia, most notably: 
 
• Economic downturn 
• Regional disparities 
• Widening sense of insecurity 
• Growing inflation 
• Rise in informal sector activities 
• Increasing unemployment levels 
• Rising poverty levels, especially among youth 
• Sense of disillusionment and alienation among a significant proportion of Tunisian society 
 
The article attributes many of these challenges to the policies of the Ben Ali regime. It notes that 
post-revolution governments’ failure to break with these policies has served to exacerbate these 
challenges. It goes on to provide a number of policy recommendations for the Tunisian 
government, focusing on the need for a development strategy for the country’s interior regions. 
La transition bloquée: Corruption et régionalisme in Tunisia 
International Crisis Group. (2017). Tunis/ Brussels: ICG.  
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/177-blocked-transition-
corruption-and-regionalism-tunisia 
This French language report focuses on economic rivalries in Tunisia. It discusses the divisions 
between established business leaders in urban areas and those running the informal economy 
and especially smuggling operations in under-privileged areas. The latter reportedly support 
violent protest against the central government in a bid to replace the established economic elites. 
The report goes on to state that economic and political competition serves to increase corruption 
and presents an obstacle to reform. This in turn reinforces inequality between regions and 
discrimination against those living in marginalised areas. The report notes that while the new 
government, led by Youssef Chaheb, has stated that it seeks to fight corruption and fix the 
national economy, it finds itself restrained by the power and influence of these economic actors. 
The report provides a series of policy recommendations for the Tunisian government, 
emphasising the importance of a national economic dialogue to accompany any government 
reforms. 
Real-time analysis of African political violence, June 2017 
Raleigh, C. & Moody, J. (2017). ACLED. pp. 10-11. 
http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_No.59-
June-2017_pdf.pdf  
Tunisia has experienced increased conflict activity in the first half of 2017. According to ACLED 
(Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) this takes the form of both popular protests 
and operations by armed Islamists. This report provides an insight into current conflict trends in 
Tunisia, emphasising the impact of economic stagnation, corruption, and political marginalisation 
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as drivers of unrest. It is based on a conflict events dataset recording acts of violence/ conflict 
activity by location. The report notes that these are the same issues that sparked the 2011 
uprisings, but that they have now become more acute. The report predicts continuing popular 
unrest in the coming months.  
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 
Jihadist violence in Tunisia: The urgent need for a national strategy 
International Crisis Group. (2016). Tunis/ Brussels: ICG. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/jihadist-violence-in-tunisia-the-urgent-need-for-a-national-
strategy.pdf 
This briefing paper notes that there has been an increase in jihadist violence in Tunisia since the 
popular uprisings in 2011, which brought about the fall of former President Ben Ali. It argues that 
the absence of a national strategy to counter violent extremism prevents the government from 
being able to address the root causes of violence. This paper argues that Tunisia’s pressing 
security challenges have resulted in a repressive state response. It notes that ‘coordination 
between the heads of state and government is poor; numerous administrative obstacles remain 
between and within ministries; and the multiple ad hoc counter-terrorism commissions often 
underperform and even fragment policymaking’ (pp.1-2). The paper argues that two unpublished 
strategic government documents on countering violent extremism, prepared in 2014 and 2015, 
should now serve as a base for the drafting and dissemination of a new document. This should 
reflect an in-depth understanding of jihadist groups in the country. The paper provides a number 
of policy recommendations for government actors regarding the design of a national strategy to 
address jihadist violence. 
Market for jihad: Radicalisation in Tunisia 
Fahmi, G. & Meddeb, H. (2015). Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_55_FahmiMeddeb_Tunisia_final_oct.pdf  
This article argues that the growth of the Salafi-Jihadist movement in Tunisia can be attributed to 
the Ben Ali regime (1987-2011), and his monopolisation of the religious sphere and simultaneous 
neglect of socio-economic issues. It argues that Ben Ali’s tight control over religious matters left a 
vacuum following the 2011 revolution, which created space for radical Islamist discourse. The 
article also attributes radicalisation to several post-revolution factors, including the 
disillusionment of Tunisia’s youth and the ‘mishandling’ of the Salafist threat. It provides a 
number of policy recommendations for the government on countering the jihadist threat. 
An Islamist ‘renaissance’? Religion and politics in post-
revolutionary Tunisia 
Wolf, A. (2013). The Journal of African Studies, Vol. 18(4). pp. 560-573. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.829979   
This peer-reviewed journal article looks at the role of Salafists in Tunisia. It argues that while 
there has been a lot of focus on Salafism from the international community, Salafists in Tunisia 
are a heterogeneous movement, which prevents them from unifying against the government (p. 
560). It states that, the Salafist movement ‘has many competing narratives as to what represents 
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‘the true Islam’ and how to implement sharia, the main differences being the Salafists’ respective 
method – violence versus non-violence – their approach – gradual versus immediate – and their 
outlook – national versus international’ (p. 570). However, the article argues that despite this, 
‘ultra-conservative thought’ is now a feature of Tunisian life. The article also highlights the fact 
that Salafi jihadists have mixed with criminal elements to pose a threat to security and stability (p. 
570). It argues that broader regional attitudes towards religious conservatism, as well as harsh 
socio-economic conditions inside Tunisia suggest that Salafism is likely to increase in the future, 
with the country being increasingly confronted with religiously motivated unrest, as in 
neighbouring Algeria and Libya (p. 571).  
Salafism, liberalism, and democratic learning in Tunisia 
Cavatorta, F. (2015). The Journal of North African Studies. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1081464   
This peer-reviewed journal article assesses the rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia, a Salafi-jihadist 
movement that emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. It argues that Ansar-al Sharia’s 
heterogeneity initially worked in its favour, as it enabled the movement to attract Salafis of all 
persuasions. However, it argues that this also contributed to the movement’s downfall because it 
never committed to a specific strategy to achieve its goals, nor did it take a stand on doctrinal 
matters. The support for democratic institutions in Tunisia following the revolution, led to Ansar-al 
Sharia using the new liberal environment to openly proselytise and speak out against democracy 
and liberalism. The article concludes that this approach was ultimately counter-productive as it 
served to strengthen the consensus among political actors on the need to build a democratic 
system.  Moreover, it led to the movement being perceived as a threat to stability. It was 
ultimately banned in 2013, and hundreds of young men suspected of being Salafi-jihadists were 
imprisoned. The article notes the paradox that in order to ‘save’ democracy from Ansar al-Sharia, 
the government began to employ illiberal practices such as indiscriminate arrests and torture. It 
also highlights the fact that some Salafists attempted to reorganise in order to benefit from 
Tunisia’s new liberal framework, while at the same time opposing it. 
POLITICAL REFORM, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
Tunisia: Transitional justice and the fight against corruption 
International Crisis Group. (2016). Tunis/ Brussels: ICG. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/168-tunisia-transitional-justice-and-the-fight-against-
corruption.pdfT 
This report highlights the significance of political tensions between supporters and opponents of 
Tunisia’s transitional justice process. It notes that failure to apply the transitional justice process 
in the economic sphere serves as a significant obstacle to the implementation of anti-corruption 
policies and policies to stimulate the economy. The report describes transitional justice in the 
period after the fall of President Ben Ali in 2011 as ‘revolutionary justice’, detailing an arbitrary 
and politicised process, whereby victims of the former regime received ‘material and symbolic 
reparations’ and businessmen believed to have been involved in corruption had their assets 
seized, faced trials or were blackmailed (p. i). It explains that the Truth and Justice Commission 
(Instance vérité et dignité, IVD), established in 2013, lost official support following political 
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change in 2014, adding that the discussion about transitional justice in Tunisia became more 
polarised in 2015. The report provides a number of policy recommendations for the Tunisian 
government regarding the implementation of the transitional justice process. 
A quiet revolution: The Tunisian military after Ben Ali 
Grewal, S. (2016). Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/168-tunisia-transitional-justice-and-the-fight-against-
corruption.pdfT 
This article finds that while the military has traditionally been underfunded and underequipped, its 
position has strengthened in the last five years since the 2011 uprising. It describes how the 
increasing security threat in Tunisia has meant that military officers have been appointed to 
several civilian and security posts. Moreover, eleven military officers have assumed 
governorships since the revolution. Some of these have been for multiple terms in different 
governorates, especially in interior and border regions where security threats are greatest. The 
article argues that this strengthening of the military could cause concern amongst those 
interested in democracy, providing several policy recommendations for how the strengthening of 
the military can be managed democratically.  Another key point made in the article is that the 
Ministry of Interior and powerful police unions appear envious of the military’s growth, and that 
the consequences of this will depend on how the government chooses to handle the relationship 
between these different security actors. 
Political transition in Tunisia 
Arieff, A. & Humud, C.E. (2015). Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21666.pdf  
This report provides an overview of the key challenges facing Tunisia following the 2014 
elections. It outlines socio-economic and political drivers of conflict. Particular emphasis is placed 
on violent extremism, and the threat posed by groups operating in Tunisia and in the wider North 
Africa region. The report also looks at transitional justice and Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
the challenges posed by tensions between the security forces and civilian leaders.  
MARGINALISED AND INSECURE BORDER AREAS 
Marginalisation, insecurity and uncertainty on the Tunisian-Libyan 
border: Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba from the perspective of their 
inhabitants 




This report, based on over 700 interviews with residents of Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba looks at 
tensions on the Tunisian-Libyan border. The report finds that these tensions have been on the 
rise in recent years, but peaked in 2012. Moreover, it finds that In Dhehiba and Ben Guerdane, 
respectively, 20.5 per cent and 23.5 per cent of respondents reported having participated in a 
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protest movement in 2015. Protestors’ demands generally focus on opening the border and 
development. The report also assesses the threat posed by armed Islamist groups along the 
border. It argues that ‘the strengthening of the security apparatus, the militarisation of the border, 
and the active support and cooperation with Western capitals were not enough to protect the 
country and its border area from IS’ (p. 25). However, it notes that the jihadist threat is generally 
related to Tunisian domestic issues, rather than to foreign influence. It attributes the jihadist 
threat to the ‘crisis of state regulation’ and the lack of economic and social rights in 
disadvantaged border areas (p. 25).  
Tunisia’s borders (II): Terrorism and regional polarisation (Update 
briefing) 
International Crisis Group. (2014). Tunis/ Brussels: ICG. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/tunisia-s-borders-II-terrorism-and-regional-polarisation.pdf  
This report finds that the relationship between arms and drug traffickers and armed jihadists has 
strengthened in border areas since 2013. It states that illegal trade networks’ activities 
‘encourage’ violence, a phenomenon the media is quick to blame on terrorists. The report goes 
on to argue that ‘these mixed groups are becoming more professional: corrupting members of 
the security forces; recruiting young men involved in petty crime to settle scores with competitors; 
attacking army and national guard units that obstruct trafficking; or securing food supplies from 
marginalised communities in the mountainous areas’ (p. 9). Key routes are: Morocco-Algeria-
Tunisia-Libya for cannabis resin; Libya-Tunisia-Algeria for military equipment; Algeria-Tunisia for 
hunting rifles used for personal protection. According to one interviewee the principle aim of 
some of the security incidents described as terrorist activity, is in fact to secure the transport of 
these goods (p. 9).  
This report also states that there has been an increase in clashes between security forces and 
jihadist brigades in border areas since the end of 2013. Along the northern part of the Tunisian-
Algerian border such clashes regularly result in casualties among army soldiers and the National 
Guard. According to this report, the fact that the jihadist movement in Tunisia is increasingly 
weakening and fragmenting, is making it more dangerous in some respects. It argues that ‘at a 
national scale, there exists a genuine risk of isolated elements pursuing a path of individual 
violence or rallying the pro-IS current as a result of the near- eradication of Ansar al-Sharia’ (p. 
4). However, the report finds that at the regional or international level, jihadi victories in the 
region are strengthening the hold of radical Islamism and its ‘fascination’ for many young 
Tunisians. There are currently several thousand Tunisians already fighting alongside Islamist 
militias in Libya and IS in Iraq and Syria. This reportedly makes it very difficult to stop the cycle of 
repression/radicalisation that Tunisia is currently experiencing. The report provides a number of 
policy recommendations on how to mitigate the jihadist threat for the Tunisian government.  
The geographic trajectory of conflict and militancy in Tunisia 
Boukhars, A. (2017). Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Centre. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP313_Boukhars_Tunisia_Final.pdf  
This article argues that Tunisia’s border areas are particularly prone to social discontent, 
expressed through sometimes violent protests and violent extremism. It argues that the sources 
of this discontent are: 
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• Loss of confidence in the country’s democratic transition among youth in border areas. 
• A desire for a more equitable distribution of state resources and transparent and inclusive 
processes for managing the country’s natural resources. 
• The state’s failure to reform its system of governance. 
• The state’s tendency to stigmatise protestors as ‘smugglers and terrorists’ (p. 1). 
The report argues that the state’s hard-line security policies often exacerbate social tensions, 
political violence, and militancy. It presents a number of policy recommendations for the Tunisian 
Government and the international community, emphasising the need for a new approach to the 
country’s border regions. 
On the edge? Trafficking and insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan 
border 
Kartas, M. (2013). Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-
Edge.pdf  
This working paper provides a detailed insight into arms trafficking and extremism in Tunisia, 
discussing the country’s principle security challenges. It argues that there are deep divisions 
between tribes and clans in Tunisia, as well as between coastal elites and ‘disenchanted’ youths 
from the interior and under-privileged urban neighbourhoods. It goes on to argue that these 
divisions have resulted in violent protests, which could develop into armed conflict if grievances 
and divisions are not addressed.  
This paper also highlights the fact that Tunisia’s borders are porous and that the security forces 
are not sufficiently well-equipped to patrol land and sea borders. It argues that in the medium-
term insecurity in Libya and the joining of forces of militias with criminals and traffickers, poses 
the greatest threat to Tunisia’s security. In addition, it highlights the threat posed by trans-
national extremist groups and the rise of Salafism in Tunisia, emphasising the potential for 
radicalisation among Tunisian youths. 
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